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I. INTRODUCTION
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 is
the policy for the government's privatization program. It
is the general policy of the government to rely on
commercial sources, whenever appropriate, to supply products
and services needed. This policy has resulted in procedures
for determining whether commercial type activities should be
done in-house, using government personnel, or performed
under contract with commercial sources. The procedures of
A-76 are first to compel an activity to critically evaluate
current operating procedures and manning level and then to
solicit bids from the private sector for performing these
functions. The purpose of Circular A-76 is to provide the
most efficient operation at the least cost to government.
The Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) has a force
inventory of 126 ships, of which 73 belong to the Nucleus
Fleet. The Nucleus Fleet is made up of U. S. Navy Ships
(USNS) which are owned and operated by MSC. Since the
primary function of these ships is special mission, they are
classified as activity-type ships instead of fleet support.
In January 1984, MSC initiated cost comparison studies
on activity-type ships in accordance with the OMB and
Department of the Navy directives.
A. THESIS SCOPE
The objective of this thesis is to attempt to answer the
following questions:
- What is the effect of A-76 procedures on the cost of MSC
Nucleus Fleet operation?
- Will A-76 procedures affect readiness and maintenance
quality of MSC Nucleus Fleet?
- What problems have been encountered with the application
of A-76 to the MSC vessels?
This thesis is patterned after A Pilot Study of the
Impact of OMB Circular A-76 on Motor Vehicle Maintenance
Cost and Quality in the U.S. Air Force , published by the
Rand Corporation in February 1985 [Ref. 1] . The findings of
this thesis parallel that of the Air Force study.
B. METHODOLOGY
Research methods used to address the objective questions
were personal interviews and a review and study of pertinent
literature and publications. Data on cost savings, manning
reduction, ship operation, readiness, and contract ad-
ministration was provided by MSC Headquarters in Washington,
DC, and MSC Atlantic Area Command in Bayonne, NJ.
Information concerning OMB Circular A-76 was provided by the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) , Washington, DC.
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I
is a brief introduction to the thesis topic. It discusses
the objective of the thesis, the methodology used in its
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preparation, and the thesis organization. Chapter II
presents a brief history of MSC, together with a discussion
on its function, mission, and responsibilities. It also
contains the organization and chain-of-command of MSC
within the Navy, as well as the operation and support
provided by the Nucleus Fleet. Chapter III outlines
background information on OMB Circular A-76 and presents
related requirements such as the Statement of Work
preparation and Cost Comparison Study requirements. Chapter
IV examines the effects of OMB Circular A-76 on the
operation of MSC vessels. Chapter V is a summary of issues
with formulated conclusions. It closes with recommended
areas for further research.
II. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (MSC)
Throughout World War II, four organizations controlled
cargo delivery—the Army Transport Service, Naval Trans-
portation Service, the War Shipping Administration and the
Fleet Service Forces. [Ref. 2] During this time the Army
and Navy operated independent shipping services. After
World War II it was decided that there should be a single
manager for all Department of Defense ocean transportation.
This would eliminate duplication in procurement, supply, and
transportation. On 2 AUG 1949 the Secretary of Defense
issued a directive making the Secretary of the Navy the
single manager for sealift and directing him to establish an
operating agency within the Navy. [Ref. 2] The Military
Sea Transportation Service was established on 1 OCT 1949.
The organization was renamed Military Sealift Command in
August 1970.
A. CHAIN OF COMMAND
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is the Navy trans-
portation operating agency for DOD Sealift and has the
status of a Navy fleet. [Ref. 3: p. 12] A flow chart of the
present DOD transportation organization is shown in Figure
1. MSC headquarters is in Washington, DC at the Navy Yard.
The Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC) , currently
Vice Admiral Walter T. Piotti, Jr. , reports directly to the
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Figure 1 Department of Defense Transportation
Organization [Source: Defense Transportation
Journal, FEB 88]
B. AREA COMMANDS
MSC has area commands for the Atlantic, Pacific,
European, and Far East headquartered in Bayonne, NJ;
Oakland, CA; London, England; and Yokohama, Japan; respec-
tively. These area commands all report to COMSC, Washington,
DC. Two smaller sub-area commands are located in Naples,
Italy and Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, and report
to their respective area commanders. Offices and small
units are located wherever sealift traffic requires. Figure
2 identifies MSC offices and commanders.
C. MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITY
1. Mission
The primary mission of MSC is to provide sealift for
strategic mobility in support of national security objec-
tives. This mission, known as Strategic Sealift, demands
the capability to deploy and sustain military forces
wherever and whenever needed, as rapidly and for as long as
operational requirements dictate. Strategic Sealift has
been formally recognized as one of the Navy's three major
functions, along with sea control and power projection.
[Ref. 4:p. 2]
MSC uses two principal sources to accomplish its
mission: U. S. Government owned ships and ships of the
U. S.—flag merchant marine. Most DOD cargo is carried by
ships of the U. S.— flag merchant marines either as common
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Figure 2 Military Sealift Command organization
ships may be used to move DOD cargo in peacetime (and are
increasingly being used solely for military exercises) or
kept in reserve status in the National Defense Reserve Fleet
and the Ready Reserve Force. In the event of war, these
government-owned ships held in reserve would be activated to
meet Strategic Sealift requirements.
2 . Responsibility
MSC responsibilities occur in three functional
areas: Strategic Sealift Force, Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force
and Special Mission Support Force.
a. The Strategic Sealift Force includes afloat
prepositioning ships and troop transports in addition to the
responsibility of sea movement of material and petroleum,
oil and lubricants (POL) in order to sustain military forces
wherever needed.
b. The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force is responsible
for direct support of the fleet units at sea worldwide.
This allows Navy combatant ships to remain on station for
long periods.
c. The Special Mission Support Ships meet the needs
of DOD and other sponsors for ocean-going ship support.
Special mission requirement efforts such as research, cable
laying and repair, medical assistance, and missile tracking
are met by the ships in this category.
D. NUCLEUS FLEET
There are currently 73 ships in the MSC Nucleus Fleet
that are operated with approximately 8,550 civil service
employees, military personnel and contract mariners. The
fleet is divided into ship types shown in Table I. In
support of MSC's mission, the ships in the Nucleus Fleet are
utilized within function areas rather than ship type.
1. Operations of the Nucleus Fleet by Ship Type
a. Major Auxiliaries, such as T-AE, T-AF and T-AO,
operate as shuttle ships, frequently steaming in formation,
replenishing combatants and operating as point-to-point
ships.
b. Minor Auxiliaries, such as T-ATF and T-ARC,
usually operate independently, but may operate with the
fleet on occasion. The fleet tugs operate with the fleet as
required for towing, rescue or salvage. The cable ships'
operations are similar to the operations of the scientific
support ships.
c. Special Mission Ships/Scientific Support
normally operate independently, but may sometimes be under
operational control of a fleet commander.
d. Transportation Ships, such as FSS, operate
similar to commercial point-to-point cargo ships. [Ref. 5]
2
.
Nucleus Ships Used to Support MSC Functions
MSC usually relies on U. S. flag commercial shipping
lines to transport military cargo, but since there are
TABLE I








T-AE AMMUNITION RESUPPLY 1
T-AF FLEET STORES 1
T-AFS COMBAT STORES 3
T-AK FMB FLEET BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUPPLY 2
T-AO FLEET OILERS 15




- T-ARC T-AK CABLE
- T-AGM, T-AGDS RANGE
INSTRUMENT
- T-AGOR OCEAN RESEARCH
- T-AGS OCEAN SURVEYING





- FSS FAST SEALIFT SHIPS
( TRANSPORTATION
)
- T-AH HOSPITAL SHIP
- T-AVB AVIATION LOGISTIC
TOTAL 73
*Part of the Nucleus fleet but not identified with a
specified mission area.
Source: COMSC Force Inventory 4 APR 1988.
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cargos that commercial carriers cannot lift, MSC must
maintain its own controlled fleet to handle such cargo.
a. In support of Strategic Sealift, MSC uses
Maritime Prepositioning Ships, Ready Reserve Force ships,
Fast Sealift Ships, common-use dry cargo ships, point-to-
point tankers, and passenger ships (when assigned)
.
b. The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) is part
of the Navy's Total Combat Support Force. This auxiliary
fleet includes oilers, fleet tugs, fleet ballistic missile
resupply ships, stores ships, ammunition ships and ocean
surveillance ships. The support which NFAF ships provide
includes underway replenishment, towing, salvage and special
services, and point-to-point transfer of fleet ballistic
missiles and related cargo.
c. Cable laying and repair ships, missile range
instrumentation ships, oceanographic surveying ships and
hospital ships are assigned to the Special Mission Support
Division. These ships' services include oceanographic
research, missile tracking, communication, medical assis-
tance and other unusual missions.
This study will focus on the impact of A-76 as it is
applied to ships in the Special Mission Support Division of
the Nucleus fleet.
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III. OMB CIRCULAR A-7 6
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. Conception of Commercial Activities Program
The first attempt to formulate a policy of reliance
on the private sector for the performance of commercial
activities was published in a report of the Special
Committee of the House of Representatives in 193 3. [Ref. 6]
The committee recommended termination of many of the in-
house functions that had begun during World War I. World
War II brought about a brief interruption in the move toward
privatization. However, shortly thereafter, congressional
interest resurfaced. [Ref. 7: p. 2] Four more reports from
other House and Senate committees failed to result in the
enactment of any legislation or executive decision towards
commercial activities.
The first Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to
create such a policy took place in 1952. This departmental
effort was very limited in nature, and had little impact on
DOD operations. [Ref. 8]
It was not until 1954, during the Eisenhower
Administration, that the executive branch became a serious
factor in attempts to shift activities from government
performance to performance by commercial enterprises. In
12
his first budget message during the same year, President
Eisenhower stated that,
This budget marks the beginning of a movement to
shift... to private enterprise Federal activities that can
be more appropriately and more efficiently carried on in
that way. [Ref. 9]
Subsequently in 1955, the Bureau of Budget (BOB) Bulletin
Number 55-4 was issued. The bulletin echoed the Presi-
dent's basic policy that commercial activities and services
would be procured from the private sector unless it could be
clearly demonstrated that it would not be in the public
interest to do so. [Ref. 10]
2 . Development of Circular A-76
The first Bureau of Budget Circular A-76 was issued
in 1966 [Ref. ll:p. 2]. The A-76 circular supported the
basic policy but differed from Bulletin No. 55-4 in that it
specifically listed five basic exceptions when commercial
or industrial-type functions were eligible to be performed
in-house [Ref. ll:p. 7].
- Procurement from commercial sources would disrupt or
delay a DOD program.
- In-house performance is necessary to maintain military
training or readiness.
- A satisfactory commercial source is not available.
- Products or services are available from other federal
agencies.
- Contract performance is more costly.
The circular was revised in 1967 as Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. This revision
13
attempted to address criticisms that A-76 guidelines were
too vague and unstructured. It introduced numerous changes
to clarify and expand upon the methods by which in-house and
contracting out cost comparisons were to be conducted. It
also required that a cost analysis be conducted prior to
initiating a new start or continuing a government function,
unless in-house performance was clearly justified by one of
the other exception criteria. The heavy emphasis on cost
analysis was a major shift in contracting out policies.
[Ref. ll:p. 7]
3 . Creation of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
The decade of the 1970' s continued to reflect
concern that A-76 guidelines and procedures were too vague
and that the implementation of these guidelines was not
uniform across all agencies. [Ref. 12] A Commission on
Government Procurement was established to review the
government's procurement system. The commission recommended
that an objective, systematic system, uniformly applied was
needed to insure credibility and fairness in deciding who
would perform commercial activities. The Congress held
hearings in 1973 and 1974 to review the recommendations of
the Commission. As a result of the hearings, Public Law 93-
400 was enacted in 1974. The statute created the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within 0MB, with one of
its major objectives being the improvement of government
14
wide implementation of the A-76 commercial activities
program. [Ref. 13]
4 . Revision of Circular A-76
Additional policy guidance aimed at improving
compliance was issued from 1974 through 1977, but no
substantial changes occurred. OFPP, after a comprehensive
study of the entire policy, revised OMB Circular A-76 once
again in 1979. The 1979 revision insured that a systematic
approach was used. It required the development of perfor-
mance work statements (also know as statements of work)
,
management study reviews and detailed cost comparisons. A
Cost Comparison Handbook (CCH) , also published in 1979,
provided detailed instructions for use by all agencies in
conducting cost comparison studies of in-house versus
contractor costs. [Ref. 11]
The current policy guidelines regarding the
performance of commercial activities are contained in the 4
August 1983 version of A-76 and its most recent update,
Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, dated 12 August 1985. The
cost comparison methodology was changed from the complex
full cost method outlined in the CCH, to a simpler incremen-
tal approach. Many of the complex cost computations that
were often contested were either eliminated or replaced by
standard cost factors. [Ref. 14:pp. 9-10]
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B. IMPLEMENTATION OF A-7 6
OMB Circular A-76 requires all executive agencies,
military and civilian, to develop an inventory of their
activities, making a determination as to those that should
remain government functions and those that could be
performed by commercial contractors. DOD's list of these
activities is maintained by the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Installations) Installation Services,
Alexandria, VA. An annual update of the agencies' inventory
is a requirement of the Circular.
Circular A-76 specifies that profit-seeking firms are
not appropriate sources of services that are "inherently
governmental in nature" [Ref. 15] and are therefore excluded
from this policy. Inherently governmental services include
judicial functions, law enforcement, conduct of foreign
policy, national defense, intelligence and counter-
intelligence operations, tax collection, regulation of
industry and commerce, and financial administration of
government.
Some other categories and situations that are excluded
from the provisions of A-76 are: [Ref. 15]
- Major system acquisitions governed by OMB Circular A-
109.
- Contractor Support Services which include consulting
services, studies and analysis, and professional and
management support services.
- When the activity is performed outside the United
States, its territories, or possessions.
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- When products and services are obtained from other
federal agencies which are authorized or required by
law to furnish them.
- In times of declared war or military mobilization.
Circular A-76 procedures are also waived for DOD procurement
of research, development, tests, or evaluation. [Ref. 16]
C. APPLICATION OF A-7 6
A-76 application in military agencies follows a four
step procedure: First, activities are identified as
appropriate for performance by commercial sources. Second,
each site where the activity is performed is examined to
identify any special circumstances that would make commer-
cial sources inappropriate there. Third, a cost study is
made at each site where commercial performance of the task
is appropriate. Fourth, the task is actually performed by a
contractor or in-house staff under the rules specified in
Circular A-76. [Ref. 1]
D. CIRCULAR A-7 6 PROCEDURES
1. Cost Study
The cost study also known as a management study,
determines if it is more economical to perform the operation
in-house or to let a contract for its performance by a
profit-seeking firm. This study is the most complex phase
of the entire A-76 process. It describes procedures for
achieving the most efficient and effective in-house
17
performance of a commercial activity and consists of four
stages: [Ref. 1]
- a detailed preparation of the performance work
statement/statement of work to be performed,
- a cost estimation of the work to be performed using
government employees,
- solicitation of bids, usually fixed-price, from
commercial contractors for performance of the work,
and,
- selection of the lowest bid submitted, after cost
comparison, by the organization deemed competent to
perform the work.
2 . Development of the Statement of Work
The preparation of the Statement of Work (SOW) is
one of the most critical features of contracting under the
implementation of Circular A-76. Its design will directly
impact the nature of the solicitations, the cost comparison
process and subsequent performance either by in-house
personnel or by contractor employees. The SOW should
establish the government's actual minimum requirements for
performing the service. These standards are the same
regardless of whether the work is performed by the govern-
ment or by a contractor.
The SOW constitutes the specifications for the
contract. It should be sufficiently comprehensive,
expressing all requirements in a clear, concise and
unambiguous manner. It should describe all duties, tasks,
responsibilities, and frequencies of performance. The SOW
should describe exactly what work is to be done, without
18
prescribing how it must be done, and the standards to which
the work must conform. [Ref. 17] Compliance is judged by-
random sampling methods, and noncompliance may lead to
automatic deductions from government payments to
contractors. These financial penalties, known as "deducts",
should be addressed in the SOW, and charged if performance
standards are not satisfied. When "specific" procedures are
required, the government bears the risk that compliance may
still result in unacceptable performance. However, if the
SOW establishes the minimum acceptable quality level (AQL)
,
then the contractor assumes full legal liability for meeting
this level of standard. [Ref. 18]
A quality assurance plan is required [Ref. 19]
along with the SOW. This plan sets the surveillance
requirements and procedures for the government's quality
assurance evaluators. The quality assurance plan helps to
ensure that adequate performance is achieved and establishes
the mechanisms for the administration of the service.
Quality standards are designed to be objectively measurable,
and quality control is part of the contractor's respon-
sibility.
Chapter IV will address MSC's newly implemented
quality assurance program and SOW.
3 . Contract Preparation
Once the SOW is converted to a solicitation which
sets the basis of contractor bids, the government and
19
potential contractors prepare competitive bids to perform
the tasks described in the solicitation. Contractors are
free to use whatever method they prefer to calculate
overhead, wages, fringe benefits, profit, and other budget
items.
The DOD Authorization Act of 1981 requires that
government in-house estimates be based on the "most
efficient and cost effective organization for performance".
[Ref. 20] The activity is not required to achieve the most
efficient organization (MEO) prior to a cost comparison
study but it must use the MEO as the basis for the
government in-house estimate. [Ref. 18]
4 . Cost Estimation
The cost of using the government to perform tasks
described in the SOW is more complex to estimate than the
cost of using a contractor. The government estimate must be
based on the same SOW used for contract solicitation.
Normally, the government cost estimation process begins with
a major review of management procedures and practices.
Circular A-76 advises activities to conduct in-house
management reviews prior to calculating cost. This will
ensure that the operation is organized and staffed for
consistency with the activity's manpower and personnel
regulations.
Detailed procedures for calculation of material,
personnel, and overhead costs along with standard formulas
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used to estimate retirement cost, insurance, workmen's
compensation and other benefits are described in Circular
A-76. After the in-house estimate is prepared it must be
reviewed by a qualified activity, usually by an independent
audit agency. The area Naval Audit Service normally
performs this service for Navy commands, ensuring compliance
with A-76. The Audit Service also reviews and approves the
proposed SOW and the MEO. This audit must be started 12
days prior to bid opening. [Ref. 21]
5. Solicitation
When the in-house estimate has been approved,
contract bids or proposals will be solicited. Although firm
fixed-price contracts are the preferred method of contract-
ing, other pricing arrangements and formal advertising may
be approved in rare instances. [Ref. 22] Sealed bids
submitted by the government and potential contractors are
opened and costs compared.
-
1-
The contracting officer opens the bids on the
appointed date and determines the lowest acceptable contract
price of the responsive and qualified bidders.
6. Cost Comparison
If the lowest contract price appears to be suf-
ficiently less costly (less than 90 percent of the govern-
ment cost) , a pre-award survey is conducted to determine if
^If no contractors bid, work goes directly to the
government. If there is no government bid, a contractor is
selected to perform the work.
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the lowest bidder is capable of performing the work. If so,
the contract is awarded and the in-house operation is
dismantled. [Ref. 1]
If all contract bids exceed 90 percent of the in-
house cost, then the government performance is noted as the
lowest bid and the cost comparison process is complete.
Circular A-76 provides for the use of differentials
in considering conversions of either in-house or contract
performance when the contract price is less than the in-
house estimate. Adjustments are made to the in-house bid to
consider the cost of capital charge that may be added if
government assets are required to assure contract perfor-
mance. The lowest bid contract price is also adjusted to
consider several factors. A cost of capital charge may be
added when government assets are required to insure
contractor performance. Conversion costs are added to
reflect the one time costs incurred by the government in
switching operations from in-house to contract. [Ref. 18]
When an activity experiences a reduction of present
capacity as a result of contracting out an operation, the
additional amount of overhead that must be absorbed is
added to the contract cost. Another adjustment made to the
contract price is the deduction of the potential federal
income tax revenue that would be paid by the contractor.
After all adjustments have been made, an existing
in-house function will not be converted to contract
22
performance unless the conversion will result in savings of
more than 10 percent of the government estimated personnel
related cost. This (cost) differential is included to
account for the possible loss of production, the temporary
decrease in efficiency and effectiveness, and other
unpredictable risks that result from contract conversion.
[Ref. 23]
E. DECISION AND APPEAL PROCEDURES
Upon completion of the cost comparison process, a
recommendation is made to either award the contract or
perform the function in-house. The recommendation, along
with the cost comparison forms, is forwarded to the
approving authority for review and approval . Once
approved, the results of the cost study are announced and
the detailed analysis is made available to the public. If
no significant discrepancies are identified or an appeal
lodged within 5 working days (which may be extended by the
contracting officer up to 15 days for complex decisions)
,
the contracting officer will either award the contract or
cancel the solicitation. In the event the function is to
be performed in-house, implementation of the MEO must be





This chapter has briefly outlined the background and key
features of 0MB Circular A-76, the related documents that
supplement and clarify the circular, and the development of
the procedures contained in these directives. Chapter IV
will examine how the procedures of A-76 were applied to MSC
Nucleus Fleet.
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IV. MSC SHIPS AND OMB CIRCULAR A-7 6
A. INTRODUCTION
Although OMB Circular A-76 was reissued with force in
1979, its procedures were not implemented by MSC for several
years. MSC, along with a number of other federal agencies
(inside and outside DOD)
,
did not feel the need to disrupt
their functional operating procedures in order to implement
the unfamiliar procedures set forth by Circular A-76. It
was only during the following election year, 1980, that its
implementation was pursued by presidential candidate Ronald
Reagan as part of his campaign platform.
Reagan promised that more Navy and Marine operations
would be contracted out to the private sector. This action,
he argued, would allow commercial contractors to hire
merchant mariners to operate and maintain the ships under
contract. As a result of this campaign promise, Reagan won
the support of the Seafarers International Union (SIU) , one
of the major merchant mariners unions.
Despite the rumblings of a primary presidential
contender, MSC still did not immediately begin to implement
A-7 6. However, other actions were being taken by the Joint
Maritime Congress to prompt the Navy into implementing A-7 6
procedures regarding ship operations.
24
B. THE STUDY
In December 1981 the results of a study conducted by
Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc. (Transportation Consulting
Division) for the Joint Maritime Congress on the civilian
contract operation of government ships was published. The
study focused on a proposed contract operation of 71 Navy
Fleet Support Ships and 61 MSC Nucleus Fleet Ships. The
study concluded that it was feasible for MSC to consider
commercial contract operation for these vessels. However,
the following limitations were noted:
- High-tempo battle group operation may be difficult with
contract crews.
- Dedicated pools of merchant mariners and no-strike
agreements would be necessary to ensure crew continuity
under contract operations.
The study also pointed out that the feasibility of
contracting out the ships depended on three key factors:
"Impact on military readiness and command and control,
civilian manpower implications, and cost savings to the
government." [Ref. 5] Results of the study showed that
contracting out MSC Nucleus fleet, Special Mission ships
would not compromise the necessary readiness or command and
control requirements and would present no significant
problems. The results also showed that implications to
civilian manning favor contract operations of MSC ship for
the following reasons: [Ref. 5]
- Across-the-board reductions in crew size are indicated
for contract operation compared to civil service
operation.
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- Contract manning would create jobs for merchant
mariners.
- There is a sufficient number of skilled merchant marines
to man MSC ships.
Finally, the results indicated that cost estimates would be
about the same (within plus or minus 10 percent) for a
commercial contractor to man each of the ship types when
compared to MSC manning requirements.
The findings fell on deaf ears within MSC, and contract
operations under Circular A-76 continued to be ignored.
C. THE PUSH
In 1983 President Reagan, feeling pressure from the SIU,
criticized the Navy for not contracting out eligible ships
under OMB Circular A-76. President Reagan's action was
politically motivated in that an election year was
approaching and he wanted the support of the union for re-
election. The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) was directed
to initiate proceedings implementing commercial activity
regarding MSC ship operations.
On 19 January 1984 the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Logistics) , by direction of the CNO, sent a letter to the
Commander, MSC directing MSC to develop Requests for
Proposal (RFP) to initiate commercial contract manning of
the operating crews for several special mission ships by 15




Upon receipt of this tasking from CNO, MSC finally began
to set the proper implementation machinery in motion. MSC
developed Statements of Work, performed Cost Comparison
Studies and solicited bids for each type of Special Mission
Ship. Contracting out ship operations was not a new issue
for MSC; previous RFP's had been written and awarded. 2 What
was new to MSC were the procedures required for commercial
activities under Circular A-76.
The procedures associated with A-76, including a
contract award, were completed for the 12 oceanographic
ships on 6 December 1985, less than 24 months after the
tasking was received. The contract was awarded to Lavino
Shipping Company Inc. for $90. OM, an estimated savings of
over $24. 8M. MSC's total in-house cost (bid) was $114. 8M.
Table II is the cost comparison form for the 12
oceanographic survey ships. These ships were the first to
be processed and contracted out under A-76. This award
under A-76 procedures provided MSC with experience used in
the preparation of RFP's for the other ships.
Range, cable, and hospital ships were ultimately awarded
to in-house contracts. The government provided the lowest
bid even after taking into account conversion differentials.
2 In November 1974 Marine Transport Lines, Inc. was
awarded a contract to operate nine MSC tankers. This
contract has been renewed and is currently in effect.
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Cost comparison forms for the cable and range ships are
presented in Tables III and IV.
Implementing A-76 for ship operations provides MSC with
operating cost savings. A summary of the total savings for
each ship function is illustrated in Table V.
E. FINDINGS
The discussion of findings is organized around three key
questions that motivated this research:
- What is the effect of A-76 procedures on the cost of
operations for the MSC Nucleus Fleet?
- Will A-76 procedures affect readiness and maintenance
quality of the MSC Nucleus Fleet?
- What problems have been encountered with the application
of A-76 to the MSC vessels?
1. What is the effect of A-76 procedures on the cost of
operations for the MSC Nucleus Fleet?
Although Circular A-76 states a philosophical preference
for using commercial sources whenever possible, it
mandates cost minimization as the criterion for deciding
whether government employees or private sector contractor
should perform functions that are not intrinsically
governmental in nature. [Ref. 1]
The basis for the question was to determine if the
application of A-76 to MSC vessels saved money.
The information and data comparing the cost 3 of ship
operation before and after implementation of A-76
procedures was collected from RFP documentation including
3This comparison is only an estimation. Operational
costs for each ship type were not maintained as separate
statistics prior to A-76. The only cost that could be
readily identified per ship type was manning. Maintenance
and supplies were also not separately maintained; therefore
only estimated amounts were obtained.
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the Management Efficiency Studies (MES) for each ship type
and through interviews. The commercial activity management
(cost) study is mandatory under Circular A-76. As discussed
in Chapter III the activity must use the criteria of the
study and cost comparison to determine the most efficient
organization. The government in-house estimates are then
based on achieving the MEO.
The data in the MES for the five Range
Instrumentation Ships suggest that A-76 leads to a reduction
in manning requirements with limited increase in the use of
labor saving capital equipment. Labor saving equipment that
was installed includes a cafeteria style feeding facility
and automatic data processing machines. The manning
reductions appear to be the major cause of savings
associated with A-76 procedures. Table VI illustrates the
proposed manning reduction scale for each ship type. Note
that the range ships reduced manning from 318 crew members
required to operate four ships to 221 crew members to
operate five ships.
The management efficiency study further implies that
MSC crews were on the average significantly larger than
crews on comparable vessels in industry. [Ref. 24] This is
primarily the result of the Navy's philosophy of doing
maintenance with the ship's crew whenever possible. The
general model of MSC shipboard organization is shown in
Figure 3. All departments are not required on every ship.
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TABLE VI
PROPOSED MANNING SCALES REDUCTION 1
MANNING AUTHORIZED REDUCTION
SHIP TYPE NAME PRE A-7
6
POST A-•76 (%)






RANGE R. SENTINEL 69 40
REDSTONE 85 45
0. ISLAND 78 52
VANGUARD 86 44
POINT LOMA n/a2- 40
318 221 31%
1 Data for the oceanographic and hospital ships were not
available for the following reasons: (1) the hospital ships
were acquired and manned directly under A-7 6 procedures, (2)
the oceanographic ships were contracted out and MSC proposed
manning reduction is confidential data.
2 USNS Point Loma was not crewed with civilian personnel
prior to A-76.
Source: Management Efficieny Studies for Range
Instrumentation and Cable Ships
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The medical department is established on an as required
basis, and none of the Special Mission Ships include a
permanent supply department which is found only on MSC Fleet
Support ships. In addition to the labor saving equipment,
changes to operating procedures were recommended to
accommodate the reduction of positions. Such changes
included:
- Using Night Mates and Night Engineers on weekends,
- converting some dayworkers, such as First Officers, to
watchstanders, and
- using contract guard service when ships are in port.
Some form of operational change and reduced manning
was recommended for all ships. The manning reduction
recommended for the oceanographic ships was a smaller
percentage than those proposed for the range and cable
ships. Persons interviewed said this was a reason why MSC
lost the award of these ships. The contractors bidding for
award of the oceanographic ships had no intention of doing
maintenance with the ship's crew and operating unnecessary
departments. As a result, the bids entered were for the
projected cost to crew these ships with the minimum
personnel required by industry. These ships were contracted
out, but MSC contracting officers got smarter. The RFP's
for the range and cable ships recommended the elimination of
all positions over the required industry or Coast Guard
minimum. When these minimums differ, Coast Guard
requirements took precedence. Positions recommended for
36
elimination included Stewards, Cooks-Bakers, 2 nc* Assistant
Engineers, Unlicensed Junior Engineers, Laundrymen, Messmen,
Yeomen/Storekeepers and Radiomen. Engineering and Steward
Departments took the largest personnel cuts. On the range
ships alone there was a reduction of 41 personnel from the
Engineering Departments and 68 personnel from the Steward
Departments
.
Along with manning reductions, wage scale
differences of union mariners and civil service mariners
together with insurance premiums paid by contractors also
increased MSC cost savings. The Navy's cost comparison
studies show that the use of Civil Service personnel is 20
percent less expensive than the use of contract manning.
Table VII is a comparison of four specific ratings showing
the difference in pay for a point-to-point tanker4 without
overtime or premium/penalty pay.
Overtime, premium and penalty pays are influenced by type
of ship and mission. If these pays were included,
however, the cost difference would be greater. Overtime
on Civil Service operated point-to-point tankers ranges
from 75 to 90 percent of base pay. Overtime on contract
operated tankers for MSC ranges from 12 to 14 percent of
base pay. [Ref. 25]
The wage rates used in MSC cost estimate are the
wage determinations for Civil Service mariners made by the
U. S. Department of Labor under the Service Contract Act.
As for insurance costs, an amendment to the RFP stipulates
Contractors negotiate wages with the labor union for




ANNUAL COST BY RATING—BASE PAY AND FRINGE BENEFITS—SEALIFT
TANKER BASED ON PAY RATES OF 16 DECEMBER 198
(EXCLUDES OVERTIME/PREMIUM/PENALTY PAY)
3RD ASST
MASTER 3RD MATE ENGINEER AB
CONTRACT OPERATION $188,863 $87,736 $77,833 $23,136
MSC CIVILIAN MARINERS 73.012 38.480 38.480 21.105
DIFFERENCE $115,851 $49,256 $39,353 $ 2,031
Source: DOD Testimony in Hearings before House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, July 1981, page 151.
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that the contractor shall secure the customary full form
Protection and Indemnity (P&I) marine insurance coverage.
The insurance is to cover all liabilities in the amount of
$100 million per incident. The contractor shall be
responsible for the cost of the insurance, including
deductibles. The annual insurance premium for the 12
oceanographic ships varies from $27. 4K to $29. 8K per ship.
The total premium paid is approximately $336. 6K per year, a
cost MSC could disregard. [Ref. 26] The federal government
is the MSC insurer, therefore no insurance premium was
required.
Although the operation cost data for each ship type
is not precise, Circular A-76 specifies that a commercial
contractor replaces an in-house operation only if the
contractor's bid is low enough to provide at least a 10
percent savings over the in-house bid. Thus, even if MSC
does not bid below its pre-bid operating budget, the
contractor replacing an in-house operation must do so at a
cost savings of at least 10 percent. Persons interviewed
suggested that with just a proposed reduction in manning
alone the in-house bid and cost estimates would be
significantly below MSC's traditional operating budget
allocation. Therefore, if a contractor wins the bid
competition, the ships operating costs normally drop




Consistent with these results, and with the contract
awarded to Lavino Shipping Company, interviews indicate
widespread belief that the government could win an A-76 bid
competition only by severe cost cutting. This translated
into severe personnel cuts.
Some restraint is required before concluding that
A-76 uniformly and dramatically lowers cost to the
government. Consider the following issues: First, although
A-7 6 seems to lead to dramatic reductions in the number of
crew members, these reductions may overstate the total cost
savings when A-7 6 leads to contracted-out operations. Even
though A-7 6 cost comparison guidelines deal with contract
administration costs in detail, it is possible that
contracting involves administrative costs that were not
included in the data available. These costs may be paid in
the form of additional contract administrators or, when
additional administrators are not hired, in the form of
insufficiently administered contracts or using military
personnel in unauthorized billets.
Interviews with members of the Operations Department
at MSC Headquarters and MSC Atlantic indicate that a greater
percentage of their time and personnel were doing contract
administration rather than actual operation duties.
Contract administrators were working more hours and were
still having trouble keeping up with the paperwork
requirements of A-7 6. However, even as these additional
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requirements exist at MSC, it is difficult to assess whether
these requirements do more than slightly offset the cost
savings associated with the general pattern of manning
reductions.
A second note of caution should be considered when
viewing cost comparison figures. Cost estimates exclude
fees paid to contractors for performing unanticipated
services not included in the statement of work and the cost
for maintenance performed in port previously done by the
crew.
The third cautionary note concerns the time frame
covered by the data available. These data allow examination
of short-term costs only. Interviews with Engineering and
Operations Department personnel indicate that as a result of
the fixed-price structure of A-76 contracts, there is a
strong incentive for contractors to do a minimum amount of
required maintenance. Doing the minimum costs less and take
less time. Unfortunately, not only the contractor operates
this way. Because of the massive manning reductions
imposed, even ships operating under in-house contracts
suffer from limited required maintenance. It is possible
that data covering a longer period of time would show
different effects of A-76 procedures on the cost of
maintenance and subsequently operations, in the long run.
In summary, after having alerted readers to
ambiguities and limitations of the findings about cost
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effects of A-76, a brief summary is provided. Interviews
and limited administrative data suggest that A-76 leads to:
- very large reductions in manning, and;
- in-house operations are able to avoid certain expenses
that must be borne by contractors.
2 . Will A-76 procedures affect readiness and main-
tenance quality of the MSC Nucleus Fleet?
Interviews with personnel and other data indicates
that, in general, the implementation of A-7 6 has had little
to no effect on readiness of MSC vessels. Readiness data,
described as the ship's ability to fulfill operational
duties and required time at sea, indicates that readiness
has been unaffected or improved since A-76 was implemented.
This stems from the fact that contractors do not get
reimbursed for wages paid while the ship is in port over a
specified number of days. Therefore, ships are only in
port for scheduled maintenance, overhaul, drydock or as
required by sponsor.
The transition to A-76 procedures has involved
enormous cutbacks in crew personnel who perform maintenance
onboard the ships. Repair work is limited to minimum
solutions, even when small increments in time and materials
would lead to much more thorough and beneficial maintenance.
Emphasis is now placed on monitoring the condition of the
vessels and anticipated maintenance requirements, rather
than performing preventive maintenance. This deferred main-
tenance has led to problems for MSC's quality assurance
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(QA) supervisors when assessing QA levels specified in the
statement of work. However, an engineer interviewed stated
that deferred maintenance problems and the assessment of
contractor quality assurance levels are not shortcomings of
A-76, but rather MSC's lack of a quality assurance program.
Prior to A-7 6, MSC used the crew to perform
preventive maintenance, repair work and overhauls. This in-
house performance was never quantified by MSC; there was no
need for a QA plan. For example, when something was broken
or rusted, it was simply repaired or painted. An area of
concern for some MSC personnel is cosmetic maintenance. An
operations officer interviewed reported displeasure with the
appearance of the ships. Comments such as "rust buckets"
and "embarrassment to MSC" were stated. Another area of
concern was that without preventive maintenance, equipment
casualties will increase as the years go by. Both of these
concerns should have been addressed in a formal QA plan.
A-76 procedures require QA standards and minimum
levels of acceptance. Whereas maintenance and upkeep
programs were addressed in the SOW, MSC's acceptable quality
level and standards was not. The SOW instructs the
contractor to maintain each ship so as to comply with U. S.
Coast Guard requlations (Code of Federal Requlations Chapter
46) and the rules of the American Bureau of Shipping. MSC
minimum maintenance standards were omitted from the SOW and
without these standards, MSC QA supervisors are unable to
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determine if the maintenance performed would satisfy MSC's
minimum requirements. In May 1987, MSC developed a QA
program that implemented maintenance standards for MSC
vessels. Appendix B is the background paper recommending QA
program implementation. Data to evaluate the effects of the
program is not yet available.
To briefly summarize findings about the effect of
A-76 on readiness and maintenance
—
personnel interviewed
report that readiness remains the same or improved under
A-76, while problems with deferred maintenance have not been
fully assessed. Personnel reported that A-76 procedures
lead to reduced crews (contract or in-house) to do the
absolute minimum of maintenance necessary. These same
personnel also state that steaming time or time at sea, an
indicator of fleet maintenance and readiness, is sustained.
3 . What problems have been encountered with the
application of A-76 to the MSC vessels?
Organizational and subsequent operational changes
virtually always proceed by trial and error. Changes of
the type required by OMB Circular A-76 are no exception to
this rule. Personnel interviewed have mentioned some
descriptions of the trials and errors that have accompanied
implementation of A-76 in MSC vessels. The descriptions of
these problems are not a comprehensive catalogue of all the
things that have gone awry in implementing A-7 6. Some are
correctable areas while others may pose serious threats to
the operational performance of the vessels or even to the
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realization of the goals of Circular A-76. Attention to the
problem area will be useful, both in evaluating the effects
of A-76 on ship operation and in making future
implementations of A-7 6 proceed more smoothly. First,
problems that have occurred with in-house contracts will be
considered. Then problems that have occurred with the
contract operation of the oceanographic ships will be
discussed.
a. Problems with In-House Contracts
Personnel interviewed reported that budget
provisions of A-76 are enforced only in setting an upper
limit on funding ship operations, and the statement of work
defines only a subset of the total preventive maintenance
expected of the in-house operation. A contractor is not
required to perform any tasks omitted from the SOW. If
requested to perform additional maintenance, the contractor
can refuse or can require additional fees. In contrast,
MSC's Engineering department reported that MSC must perform
maintenance, not included in the SOW, and they do not expect
to receive additional resources to perform that work.
Resources have been reduced to win the bid, while
maintenance requirements have been increased above that
specified in the work statement.
The criteria for evaluating MSC in-house
contract performance appear to diverge from A-7 6 procedures
for in-house contracts. Whereas there are specific,
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measurable criteria for the success of an A-76 contractor,
the criterion for measuring ship operation for the in-house
contract is reported to be maintaining the ships'
operational status while sustaining the maintenance quality
level that existed prior to A-76.
It appears that Circular A-76 has not been
implemented fully at MSC when the contract is awarded in-
house. However, this result is inconclusive because of the
MSC's lack of experience in dealing with A-76 procedures.
MSC has already taken steps towards full implementation of
A-7 6. The quality assurance program implemented by MSC is
an example. Another is an amendment to the SOW to include
all the tasks necessary for preventive maintenance.
Finally, receiving the required resources for necessary
maintenance is yet another step. This will prove to be a
function of the QA program.
b. Problems with the Contracted Out Operation
Many of the problems with the contract operation
stem from the same area as with in-house contracts. Many
problems result from ambiguous or incomplete SOW's.
Personnel interviewed stated that A-76 procedures work well
in areas covered by the contract. In areas where the SOW is
deficient, there are problems. The basis of these problems
appear to be the contractor's willingness to exploit SOW
shortfalls by refusing to do more work than is contractually
required, or by charging very high prices to perform work
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not originally included in the SOW. This problem appears
likely to remedy itself as old contracts expire and new
contracts are written.
Another cause of problems was MSC's lack of
providing timely quality assurance standards. Quality
assurance inspectors had no guidance for establishing the
contractor's quality assurance level. The success of
contract performance under A-76 depends fundamentally upon
the contractor's compliance with A-76 procedures, QAL being
a key requirement.
F. SUMMARY
When the bid competition is won by the government, A-76
appears to function only as a mechanism for setting a budget
ceiling. In practice, MSC in-house operations appear to be
unable to refuse demands for maintenance tasks not in the
SOW on which it bid (especially if this maintenance will
disrupt operations) and equally unable to obtain additional
resources with which to carry out this requirement.
As for MSC's A-7 6 contract operation, the major source
of difficulty appears to be the result of ambiguous and
incomplete statements of work (especially in the areas of
maintenance) and in the criteria and procedures for
measuring the contract compliance. Personnel reported that
when the contract comes up for renewal, changes will be made
to overcome problems encountered during contract
performance. With the implementation of the quality
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assurance program, MSC appears to be making progress towards
full implementation of A-76 for, its in-house operations.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Since its initial release in March 1966, the Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-7 6 has evolved into a
controversial instrument of change in the way that federal
agencies choose between in-house and commercial sources of
support services, and in the way that these agencies
manage the governmental and commercial contractors that
provide these services. Proponents of Circular A-76 claim
its virtues in reducing costs, whereas critics argue that
A-76 lowers the quality of work performed. [Ref. 1]
This thesis addressed these claims by examining the effects
of A-76 procedures on the cost, operational readiness and
maintenance of MSC Nucleus Fleet.
Implementation of Circular A-76 procedures mandates many
changes, and as noted in Chapter III, the most fundamental
features are: [Ref. 1]
- Competitive, fixed-price bidding . Government
organizations and commercial contractors submit fixed-
price bids for the right to perform services needed by
the government. If the government bid is sufficiently
low compared with bids from commercial sources, then the
government agency provides the service. Otherwise, the
contract goes to the lowest-priced, capable commercial
source. A government organization that loses an A-76
bid competition is dismantled, and its workers are
either reassigned or laid off.
- Performance work statement control . Insofar as
possible, contractors and government organizations
operating under A-76 procedures are given a statement
of work to be performed and are free to perform that
work in any safe manner that is consistent with the
demands of government or defense. The statement of
work includes performance standards for specified tasks
and financial penalties to be assessed contractors whose
performance falls below those standards by a sufficient
margin.
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Although all Federal agencies are subject to the
procedures of OMB Circular A-76, not all military activities
have performed cost studies and changed traditional
procedures according to the results. Some agencies perform
tasks that are inherently governmental and are not required
to perform cost studies. In 1984, MSC was tasked to perform
a cost study and design a request for proposal for the
Special Mission ships in its Nucleus Fleet. As a result of
these RFP ' s , twelve oceanographic survey ships were
contracted out, in-house contracts were awarded for the
operation of five each cable and range ships and two
hospital ships.
This study examined the cost, quality of maintenance and
operational readiness of these ships when the work was
performed by a commercial contractor and when MSC civil
service mariners performed the work under the government
contract. Thus this study looked at both contracting and
the application of performance work statements.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this research are based on personal
interviews, telephone conversations and other source data
from MSC's Contracting, Engineering, Operations and Manpower
departments. This research attempted to answer three
questions.
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1. What is the effect of A-76 procedures on the cost of
operations of the MSC vessels ?
Interviews and limited administrative data available
suggest that application of Circular A-76 leads to
- very large reductions in crew manning, personnel who
performed much of the maintenance task, and
- substantial differences in the short term cost of
operations when compared to pre A-76 figures.
2
.
Will A-76 procedures affect readiness and
maintenance quality of the MSC Nucleus Fleet ?
The findings on the effects of A-76 procedures on
readiness and maintenance are based mostly on personnel
interviews and data reporting ships time at sea. MSC
personnel report that the ships operational readiness
(reflected by time at sea) improved or remained the same
under A-7 6 procedures. The data on the effect of deferred
maintenance or maintenance quality is inconclusive and can
not be fully assessed at this time. However, the data
suggests that ship operation will deteriorate in the long
run if maintenance continues to be limited to tasks defined
in the current SOW.
3 What problems have been encountered with the
application of A-76 to MSC vessels ?
As to be expected when any new procedure is adapted
by an organization, application of A-76 procedures to MSC
Special Mission ships' operations has proceeded with certain
difficulties. When a bid competition is won by the MSC (in-
house operation) rather than by a contractor, A-76 appears
to function only as a mechanism for setting a budget
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ceiling. In practice, the MSC organization appears to be
forced to perform maintenance tasks not in the work
statement and is equally unable to obtain additional
resources to pay for these additional tasks.
In the commercial contract operation, the major
source of difficulty appears to result from ambiguity and
incompleteness of the statement of work and from
insufficient detail in the criteria and procedures of MSC
quality assurance level for measuring the contractor
contract compliance. However, reports from interviews
indicates that significant progress in overcoming these
problems is being made as new contracts are written. MSC
appears to be making admirable progress toward full
application of A-76 procedures.
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study covers a very limited time period in the
application of A-76 to these MSC vessels. At the time of
this research MSC only had one commercial contract operation
under A-76. This contract was in its third year of a three
year contract. Navy Audit Service was conducting an audit
to determine if the efficiency study proved to be accurate
and beneficial. The results of this audit are being
analyzed at the time of the writing of this thesis.
Therefore, based on the findings of this study and the
analysis that will be provided by Navy Audit Service,
further research in the following areas are recommended:
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Lessons learned from operating vessels with little to no
preventive maintenance.
Long-run cost factors for overhaul or dry docking as a
result of insufficient maintenance procedures and
practice. 5
Developing procedures to determine the full cost impact
associated with administrating commercial contract.
Cost should include MSC Engineering, Operation and
Personnel staff members.
5Items (1) and (2) will not be issues for future
research if the SOW is amended to address preventive
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APPENDIX B M-4El3 /RAB/rab
•MAY 1 9 1987
BACKGROUND PAPER
I. SUBJECT: QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
II. PURPOSE: To discuss options for implementation of Quality
Assurance Surveillance Pians in areas of Preventive
Maintenance and minor repairs.
III. MAJOR POINTS:
- It is necessary that MSC Headquarters establish policy for
the implementation of the Quality Assurance Surveillance
Plans (QASPs) in areas that impact engineering functions -
Preventive Maintenance and minor repairs.
— The A-76 program mandates that the Government implement
Quality Assurance cr Quality Control programs.
— QASPs •/all be implemented by both Area Commands.
- As noted in earlier discussion papers, the policy for
implementation of these plans must be:
— Fair and reasonable.
— Equitable in application, not dependent en the "quality"
of the contractor (or MSC).
— Similar to the Quality Control plan to be implemented by
MSC Tor those vessels retained for operation as a result
of A-76 action.
- The QASPs include requirements for interaction with the
contractor, using his Quality Control plan.
IV. DISCUSSION:
- The Oceanographic vessel operating contract, as the first in
the A-76 program, has required MSCLANT to implement a QASP
program while dealing with a somewhat reluctant contractor.
— The perceived lack of attention to the maintenance and
repair of the vessels has created conditions that are not
conducive to the establishment of a QASP policy that
meets the criteria noted above.
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— Poor communications and personal attitudes resulting from
these conditions, although perfectly understandable, are
not suitable for the conduct of a program that has such
far reaching impact on the way MSC does business.
MSC has never quantified "in-house" performance of Preventive
Maintenance and minor repairs.
— Although basic Preventive Maintenance requirements are
set forth in a COMSC Instruction and in technical manuals,
and SAMM is being progressively developed and installed on
ships, no means of rating performance has been established
or implemented.
— To establish a representative minor repairs list for the
contract work statements machinery history cards were
culled for the nature of repairs that MSC crews have
performed on board in the past, but no quantitative
review was made as to how often they were performed, the
practicality of the crew performing them, and whether or
not riSC crews are presently performing them.
The implementation of a Quality Assurance or Quality Control
plan should reflect the level of scrutiny that MSC is willing
or able to withstand for our own operation of A-76 ships -
the Hospital ships for example.
— Crews have difficulty in performing all of the Preventive
Maintenance required at present manning levels.
— Review of many work packages and service orders indicates
that MSC does not perform all crew capable repairs, nor
are they necessarily performed in a timely a manner.
The point of view that MSC does not need to be scrutinized as
clcsely because of our performance record is not acceptable:
— Our performance record has not always been so good.
— In establishing an equitable QASP, if basic performance
is a satisfactory assessment for MSC operation it should
also be so for contract operators, with no deducts fcr
failure to perform maintenance and repairs - off hire
would be the only reason for withholding payments.
— The establishment of surveillance programs that covers
performance in all areas is an integral part of the A-76





It is recommended that the following policy guidelines be
implemented as fair and reasonable, equitable, and in conso-
nance with the present MSC mode of operation.
Preventive Maintenance:
— Each piece of equipment will be considered an element of
the lot from which the sample will be drawn.
— Each element of the sample will be inspected, test oper-
ated, and machinery history cards reviewed for
documentation of the required maintenance actions.
— The rating given by the evaluator will reflect a compo-
site of all of these, noting the general condition of
the equipment and appraising the performance of the con-
tractor.
— Unsatisfactory ratings will be fairly subjective, but
will permit the shipboard managers to program and priori-
tize maintenance actions while keeping the general condi-
tion of the plant in satisfactory condition without being
penalized.
Minor Repairs:
— For three quarters of the year a list of minor repairs
required on each ship will be compiled as a result of a
joint walk-through by the QASP evaluator and the contrac-
tor's representative.
— The performance of these repairs will be rated as a
result of random sampling procedures during quarterly
inspections.
— Performance of specific repairs will be required immedi-
ately to maintain an acceptable material readiness of the
vessel; otherwise the outstanding repairs will remain on
the list.
— For the remaining quarter, coincidental to a pre-overhaul
inspection, a more detailed list of repairs will be made
and the sampling mode will change to 100* checklist. All
repairs, or a designated list, will be required to be
oerformed oricr to ccmDletion of the overhaul.
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— The detail of inspection used to compile the above lists
must be similar to that presently used in inspecting MSC
operated ships.
The above procedures require a certain level of subjectivity.
However, the nature of the work required is such that there
is no alternative.
The contract operator must become involved in the above
processes. Additional efforts must be made in this regard.
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